Three scenarios for the Qatar crisis: regime change, resolution or Cold War in the Gulf by Sailer, Matthias & Roll, Stephan
www.ssoar.info
Three scenarios for the Qatar crisis: regime
change, resolution or Cold War in the Gulf
Sailer, Matthias; Roll, Stephan
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Sailer, M., & Roll, S. (2017). Three scenarios for the Qatar crisis: regime change, resolution or Cold War in the Gulf.
(SWP Comment, 25/2017). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik
und Sicherheit. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-53553-8
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
  Matthias Sailer is a Ph.D. Fellow in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 25 
 Dr. Stephan Roll is Deputy Head of SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division July 2017 
1 
Stiftung  
Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute  
for International and 
Security Affairs  
SW
P
 C
om
m
en
ts
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Three Scenarios for the Qatar Crisis 
Regime Change, Resolution or Cold War in the Gulf 
Matthias Sailer and Stephan Roll 
On 5 June 2017 Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt and a number of 
allied states broke off diplomatic relations with Qatar and imposed a partial blockade. 
Their stated demand was for Qatar to cease its support for “terrorist” groups and its 
policy of “destabilising” other countries. With Qatar rejecting the charges as baseless, 
the prospects for resolution appear thin. The most conceivable scenarios are forcible 
replacement of the Qatari leadership, peaceful resolution between the parties, or con-
solidation of the rift between two camps in the Gulf. Germany and other European 
states should avoid taking sides, but should assert three fundamental demands: the 
conflict parties must respect national sovereignty and the proportionality required 
by international law, refrain from instrumentalising the fight against terrorism, and 
prevent the dispute spilling over into other conflicts in the region. 
 
Political tensions between Qatar and its 
neighbours Saudi Arabia and UAE have 
existed since the 1970s, with conflicts ini-
tially revolving largely around border dis-
putes. Today it is principally Qatar’s foreign 
policy that draws the ire of its two neigh-
bours. Especially since the advent of the so-
called Arab Spring in late 2010, Qatar has 
placed its weight behind different regional 
actors and alliances than Saudi Arabia and 
UAE, in particular the rising Muslim Brother-
hood and groups close to it (also through 
Doha-based broadcaster Al Jazeera). Riyadh 
and Abu Dhabi regard these actors as secu-
rity risks. Qatar also expanded relations 
with neighbouring Iran. This was unaccep-
table to Saudi Arabia in particular, which 
feels threatened by Iran’s regional policies. 
The first major diplomatic crisis occurred 
in 2014, but was resolved after Qatari con-
cessions; the latest embargo follows on 
directly from that dispute. While the trig-
ger was a speech by the Qatari emir sup-
posedly praising Iran as an “important 
regional power”, there is good reason to 
believe that the text as reported was ma-
nipulated by means of computer hacking. 
At a deeper level, the embargo is rooted in 
accusations that Doha had reneged on its 
promise of 2014 to align its foreign policy 
more closely with Saudi and Emirati inter-
ests. On June 5, without even issuing an 
ultimatum, Saudi Arabia closed its land 
border with Qatar and excluded Qatari 
craft from Saudi and Emirati airspace and 
territorial waters. Neighbouring Bahrain 
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also joined the embargo. Qatar must now 
rely on a narrow Iranian-controlled air and 
sea corridor. 
Concrete demands were not communi-
cated until eighteen days after the embargo 
began. They include Qatar strongly reducing 
its diplomatic relations with Iran, declaring 
the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organi-
sation and closing Al Jazeera, with monthly 
reviews to ensure compliance. Qatar offi-
cially rejected them as unacceptable on 
3 July 2017, in a letter to the Kuwaiti emir 
who acted as a mediator between the two 
sides. 
Considering these developments, three 
fundamental scenarios are conceivable, 
with widely differing likelihoods. 
Scenario 1: Regime Change in Doha 
Statements by Saudi lobbyists and articles 
in Emirati newspapers suggest that leading 
members of the Saudi and Emirati royal 
families would like to see the Qatari leader-
ship toppled and replaced. In light of the 
disproportionality of means applied, it can-
not be completely excluded that this is the 
path Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are in fact pur-
suing. But such a scenario would be incon-
ceivable without a military escalation or an 
externally supported palace coup, both of 
which currently appear unlikely. 
Military escalation in the form of a 
Saudi/Emirati invasion would involve con-
siderable risks on account of the unforesee-
able regional consequences. Both Turkey 
and Iran have underlined their backing for 
Qatar. In many spheres the objectives of 
Turkish foreign policy coincide with those 
of Qatar, and this is reflected in close mili-
tary cooperation between the two. Turkey 
maintains a military base in Qatar, and 
announced an expansion immediately after 
the blockade began – firmly rejecting Saudi 
and UAE demands to close the base. Theran’s 
support for Qatar and assistance in main-
taining supplies is no surprise given its long-
running hegemonic conflict with Riyadh. 
Most importantly of all, a military esca-
lation would contradict strategic US inter-
ests. Qatar hosts one of the largest US mili-
tary bases in the Gulf, and US Secretary of 
State Rex Tillerson has called on Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE to avoid escalating the 
conflict. The post-blockade sale of thirty-six 
US warplanes to Qatar also indicates that 
Washington is sticking by its ally. The 
known unknown here is President Donald 
Trump, who has repeatedly made extremely 
critical comments about Qatar; his messag-
ing probably encouraged Saudi Arabia and 
UAE to act as they have. 
Nor is there currently any sign of forced 
change in the Qatari leadership. Emir 
Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani may be young, 
at thirty-seven, and has only been in charge 
for five years. But closer relations with Iran 
and support for the Muslim Brotherhood – 
as the two main reasons for the present 
conflict – are fundamental policy decisions 
taken long before his enthronement. The 
centres of power are controlled by members 
of the royal family who have supported these 
policies for many years, potential rivals in 
the royal family at home or abroad there-
fore lack a viable institutional power base. 
Scenario 2: Conflict Resolution 
Both the United States and Europe are 
pressing for a rapid end to the conflict. Too 
great is the danger that the tensions will 
hamstring the fight against the so-called 
Islamic State and harm their economies 
through rising oil and gas prices or disrup-
tion of Western business activities in the 
Gulf. A mutual resolution could involve lift-
ing the embargo in return for the expulsion 
from Qatar of a number of individuals that 
Saudi Arabia, UAE and their allies regard as 
terrorists. Doha-based leaders of the Pales-
tinian Hamas have already left the country. 
Qatar could conceivably renew its promise 
to pay greater heed to the interests of the 
other Gulf monarchies in its foreign policy 
activities (including the editorial policies 
of Al Jazeera). 
The economic costs to both sides of a pro-
longed boycott mitigate in favour of this 
scenario. Apart from the immediate nega-
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tive repercussions for the Qatari state budget, 
the crisis darkens the investment climate 
across the Gulf monarchies, undermining 
their reputation as secure and stable desti-
nations. The partial blockade significantly 
increases the cost of Qatar’s imports, but 
it would also profit if market insecurity 
causes gas prices to rise. Qatar also holds 
considerable foreign investments whose 
yields are likely to cover the costs of the 
embargo at least in the medium term. 
Nevertheless, two crucial factors speak 
against this scenario. Firstly, any compro-
mise would be associated with significant 
loss of face for the leaders on both sides. 
The hard line taken by Riyadh and Abu 
Dhabi would make any peaceful resolution 
hard to communicate to domestic audi-
ences. For Doha, acquiescing to any of the 
demands from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi would 
be tantamount to a loss of sovereignty and 
make Qatar a vassal of its neighbours. At 
the same time, the history to date suggests 
that it is highly unlikely that Riyadh and 
Abu Dhabi would be satisfied with limited 
concessions. 
Secondly, the conflict has acquired a very 
personal dimension. Public statements by 
certain Saudi and Emirati politicians, and 
above all a spate of editorials in the state-
controlled media in both countries have 
directly attacked and in some cases insulted 
the Qatari emir and his father and prede-
cessor Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani. In par-
ticular the indirect threat of regime change 
must have angered Doha and lastingly shat-
tered the already difficult relationship. In 
view of these aspects, a viable long-term 
resolution must be regarded as unlikely. 
Scenario 3: Cold War in the Gulf 
The most likely option is for Qatar to under-
take everything in its power to prepare for 
future military escalation. Even if the con-
flict can be deescalated in the short term, 
Qatar can be expected to massively expand 
its political and military ties with Turkey. 
Relations with Tehran are also likely to 
intensify in view of the current reminder 
of the importance of the Iranian corridor. 
Shared gas reserves in the Persian Gulf also 
create a “lock-in effect” for the Qatari-Ira-
nian relationship. 
On the other side, Saudi Arabia, the UAE 
and Egypt can be expected to close ranks. 
The new Saudi crown prince, Mohamad Bin 
Salman, is said to enjoy a good personal 
relationship with the crown prince of Abu 
Dhabi. The planned hand-over of two Red 
Sea islands from Egypt to Saudi Arabia – 
over which negotiations began in 2016 – 
also suggests a further warming in rela-
tions between Riyadh and Cairo. 
A consolidating rift between camps in 
the sub-region could have repercussions 
on conflicts elsewhere, in which the Gulf 
states are involved directly – militarily – or 
indirectly by supplying funding and arms. 
Qatar and its adversaries could be tempted 
to inflict harm on each other in Syria, Libya, 
Yemen, the Gaza Strip or the Horn of Africa. 
Above all, a cemented antagonism would 
completely paralyse the already weak re-
gional organisations, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council and the Arab League. For the fore-
seeable future these toothless organisations 
are unlikely to manage to demonstrate 
even symbolic unity. 
Conclusions 
The third scenario is the most likely. If it 
comes to pass, it will be difficult to mediate 
between the parties. The precondition 
for successful intervention would be inten-
sified and above all coherent efforts by 
Washington, which maintains security 
partnerships with all the Gulf monarchies. 
At the same time Europe’s influence should 
not be underestimated. Ultimately Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have all been 
weakened by the conflict. And while identi-
fiable camps have emerged, they also con-
tain diverging interests within them. The 
Qataris will not want to become overdepen-
dent on Turkey and Iran, while a close part-
nership with politically unreliable and eco-
nomically stricken Egypt will be costly for 
Saudi Arabia in the medium term. Even 
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between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi differences 
exist: the UAE fights the Muslim Brother-
hood absolutely dogmatically, while Saudi 
Arabia has to date been willing to cooperate 
with associated groups outside its territory. 
In the short term mediation by the EU 
or individual member states – possibly in 
conjunction with the hitherto neutral Gulf 
states Kuwait and Oman – could help to 
defuse the acute crisis. Here there would be 
important roles for Germany and France 
especially, which enjoy good relations with 
all the states involved. But this will do little 
to resolve the underlying conflict. It is 
therefore all the more urgent for Germany 
and its European partners to address clear 
demands to all the conflict parties, defined 
by long-term considerations rather than 
short-term economic interests. It needs to 
be communicated to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi 
that national sovereignty and the principle 
of proportionality in international law must 
always be respected. Both sides should also 
be called upon to intensify their efforts to 
eliminate jihadist terrorism, without mis-
using that fight as a pretext to suppress 
political opposition. Above all, the parties 
should be pressed to avoid injecting their 
strife into other regional conflicts. 
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